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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION-THE DEMISE OF THE
LIBERALITY RULE?
Bernard Fair was injured in the course of his employment with
Korhumel Steel and Aluminum Company, and the West Virginia
Workmen's Compensation Commission awarded Fair $2,832. Fair
subsequently filed a common law negligence action against Korhu-
mel in the federal district court' on the theory that the company
had not qualified for, and therefore was not covered by, the West
Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act.2 The district court dis-
missed Fair's claim stating that although Korhumel had been
"sloppy' 3 in its attempt to qualify under the Act, it had qualified
sufficiently to bar Fair's negligence action.4 Fair appealed to the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Held, reversed. The court
of appeals ruled that Korhumel had done nothing to qualify under
the West Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act and that there
was insufficient evidence of a relationship' between the National
Steel Corporation and Korhumel for Korhumel to be covered by
the fund under the National Steel account. Fair v. Korhumel Steel
& Aluminum Co., 473 F.2d 703 (4th Cir. 1973).
The West Virginia Code outlines the procedures necessary for
an employer to qualify under the West Virginia Workmen's Com-
pensation Act. A West Virginia employer must: (1) make a deposit
with the State Compensation Commissioner at the time of applica-
tion;' (2) make quarterly payroll reports to the Commissioner;7 (3)
provide notice to his employees of the election to subscribe to the
2 The federal court had diversity jurisdiction, since Fair was a resident of West
Virginia and Korhumel was an Illinois corporation. Fair v. Korhumel Steel & Alu-
mimum Co., 473 F.2d 703, 704 (4th Cir. 1973).
2 W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-1 to -6-1 (1973 Replacement Volume).
473 F.2d at 704.
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-2-6 (1973 Replacement Volume). The Act provides:
Any employer subject to this chapter who shall elect to pay into the
workmen's compensation fund the premiums provided by this chapter
shall not be liable to respond in damages at common law or by statute
for the injury or death of any employee however occurring, after such
election and during any period in which such employer shall not be in
default in the payment of such premiums and shall have complied fully
with all other provisions of this chapter.
' See text accompanying note 16 infra.
' W. VA. CoDE ANN. § 23-2-5 (1973 Replacement Volume).
7Id.
1
Smith: Workmen's Compensation--Statutory Construction--The Demise of the
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1975
CASE COMMENTS
workmen's compensation fund;8 and (4) make quarterly premium
payments to the State Compensation Commissioner,' or, in lieu of
making payments to the fund, elect to become a self-insurer by
submitting to a finding of fact by the Commissioner that the em-
ployer is financially responsible, posting sufficient bond, and con-
tributing to the administrative costs of the Commission." A foreign
employer must comply with the same requirements as a West Vir-
ginia corporation and must also file with the Commissioner a cer-
tificate from the Secretary of State showing that the employer is
qualified to do business in the State."
Despite Korhumel's contention that it had qualified under the
Act, the court of appeals found "100 percent failure to comply
either on a premium paying basis or as a self-insurer."' 2 Korhumel
also contended that National Steel Corporation had taken suffi-
cient action to qualify Korhumel under the Act. National Steel did
attempt to qualify Korhumel as one of its divisions, and Korhumel
was listed as such with the Commission; however, the court stated
that this was an erroneous listing because of the lack of a sufficient
relationship between the two corporations. 3
The court recognized that "the West Virginia Act should not
be viewed with an overly technical eye,"" but it found that Korhu-
mel's inaction was not merely a technical flaw but one that went
to "the heart of the statute-the public policy of assuring that
employees will be protected."" The court believed that to allow
Korhumel to bar Fair's claim would be to condone the "creation
of a situation that permits an employer to choose, after the event,
whether it will be advantageous to come within the Workmen's
Compensation Act,"'" thus undermining the employee's assurance
of indemnification.
Judge Bryan dissented and stressed that Korhumel had made
no attempt to qualify under the Act on the assumption that it was
covered as a division of National Steel Corporation. Korhumel was
I Id. § 23-2-7, construed in Daniels v. Boldt Co., 78 W. Va. 124, 88 S.E. 613
(1916).
9 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-2-5 (1973 Replacement Volume).
10 Id. § 23-2-9.
" Id. § 23-2-1.
12 473 F.2d at 705.
13 Id.
I4 d.
" Id. at 706.
" Id.
2
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 77, Iss. 2 [1975], Art. 8
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol77/iss2/8
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
a wholly-owned subsidiary of National Steel, National's report of
earnings included Korhumel's payroll, and Korhumel operated
under lease on the property of National Steel at Weirton, West
Virginia. Furthermore, in 1965, representatives from National
Steel met with the Commissioner to determine Korhumel's status
and eligibility for coverage under National Steel's account. It was
decided, and confirmed by letter, that Korhumel was to be covered
under the National Steel account, and thereafter, claims by Kor-
humel Steel employees were reported under National's account
number. Fair in his application for compensation declared that he
was an employee of "National Steel Corporation (Korhumel Steel
and Aluminum Company)."17
The purposes of the West Virginia Workmen's Compensation
Act, as established by case law are: (1) prompt compensation to
injured employees;" (2) assurance of employee indemnification;
and (3) protection for employers from court suits and the resulting
verdicts." The West Virginia court has applied a so-called "liberal-
ity rule" to workman's compensation law, and has consistently
held that the Workmen's Compensation Act should be given a
liberal interpretation in order to accomplish its intended pur-
poses." By overemphasizing the finer points of compliance with
'7 Id. at 708 (dissenting opinion).
" State ex rel. Conley v. Pennybacker, 131 W. Va. 442, 448, 48 S.E.2d 9, 13
(1948).
", Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 83-84 (1971); Jones v. Laird Foundation,
Inc., 195 S.E.2d 821, 827 (W. Va. 1973) (concurring opinion); Chiericozzi v. Com-
pensation Comm'r, 124 W. Va. 213, 216-17, 19 S.E.2d 590, 592 (1942).
Jones v. Laird Foundation, Inc., 195 S.E.2d 821, 827 (W. Va. 1973) (concur-
ring opinion); Mains v. J.E. Harris Co., 119 W. Va. 730, 732-33, 197 S.E. 10, 11
(1938). See also De La Mater, A Brief Survey of the West Virginia Law of
Compensability, 62 W. VA. L. REv. 303 (1960).
In Jones, the court recognized the dual function of the workmen's compensa-
tion laws.
The very purpose of the workmen's compensation laws is to release
both employer and employee from the often burdensome common-law
rules of liability and damages. Its policy is to protect the employer from
expensive and unpredictable litigation and to provide compensation for
injuries to employees without the burdensome requirements of proving
common-law negligence.
195 S.E.2d at 827 (concurring opinion).
21 Bragg v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 152 W. Va. 706, 166
S.E.2d 162 (1969); Estes v. Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 150 W. Va. 492, 147
S.E.2d 400 (1966); Walk v. State Compensation Comm'r, 134 W. Va. 223,58 S.E.2d
791 (1950); Prince v. Compensation Comm'r, 123 W. Va. 67, 13 S.E.2d 396 (1941);
McVey v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 103 W. Va. 519, 138 S.E. 97 (1927).
[Vol. 77
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the Act and by ignoring Korhumel's relationship with National
Steel, the federal court defeated the purposes of the Act, through
a strict construction rather than a liberal application of the Act to
affect those purposes.
Fair had been promptly compensated from the fund, but by
negating Korhumel's qualification and leaving Fair to attempt to
recover through a tort action that conceivably would not be tried
for some time, the court delayed Fair's recovery," and thus de-
feated the first purpose of the Act, prompt compensation. Further-
more, instead of assuring Fair compensation, the court left him to
seek his remedy in an uncertain tort claim. Since the Commis-
sioner had already approved his award under the Act, Fair's recov-
ery will be far less assured by pursuing it through the labyrinth of
the court system. Finally, the third purpose, that of protecting the
employer from judicial action, has been frustrated by the court's
holding. After being assured by the Commissioner that it qualified
under the Act,n Korhumel was divested of its protection by the
court and left to defend a tort claim, stripped of its most effective
defenses. 4
The "liberality rule" requires that a statute be construed ex-
pansively to include cases that are within the reason or the spirit
of the law, resolving all reasonable doubts in favor of the applica-
tion of the statute to the case at hand.? The statute should receive
a construction calculated to avoid sacrificing the rights of the par-
ties to technical mistakes, inaccuracies, or omissions. 28 Whether a
statute is given a liberal construction depends upon such factors
as the language of the statute itself and the purposes and objects
of the statute.? The text of the statute provides the most accurate
determinant of how a statute is to be construed. To a lesser extent,
the purposes and objects of the statute supply the basis for this
determination. Statutes enacted to relieve suffering, hardship, or
n It is assumed that after this decision, Fair was required to return the com-
pensation award previously paid to him.
n 473 F.2d at 708 (dissenting opinion).
24 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-2-8 (1973 Replacement Volume). Under this section,
employers who are not covered by the Act may not avail themselves of the common
law defenses of the fellow servant rule, assumption of risk, or contributory negli-
gence when defending a tort action arising from damages suffered by reason of
personal injuries received in the course of employment.
21 H. BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION & INTERPRETATION OF TE LAws
§ 134 (2d ed. 1911).
2E. CPAwFoRD, THE CONSTRUCTON OF STATUTES § 254 (1940).
v 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES & STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 58.01 (4th ed. 1943).
4
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personal disadvantage are generally given a liberal interpreta-
tion."8 So also are remedial statutes, that is, those enacted to facili-
tate or improve existing remedies for the enforcement of rights or
redress of wrongs or injuries as well as to correct mistakes, defects,
or omissions in a former law."9 Workmen's compensation statutes
are generally considered remedial legislation and, as such, are to
be accorded a liberal construction."0 This construction of a work-
men's compensation act is not foreign to West Virginia or most
other jurisdictions. 31
The traditional practice of liberally construing remedial legis-
lation has been aided in the case of the West Virginia Workmen's
Compensation Act by the text of the statute itself. The first West
Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act, enacted in 1913, provided
in section forty-four that the Commission was not bound by any
common law or statutory rules of evidence or procedure other than
those appearing in the Act, and that investigations should be car-
ried out in such a manner as was "best calculated to ascertain the
substantial rights of the parties and to carry out justly and
liberally the spirit of this act."3 When the Act was revised and
reenacted in 1919, section forty-four read substantially the same
as the section passed in 1913, except that the reference to "liber-
ally" was omitted s The reference has not been included in any
later revisions of the Code." The West Virginia Supreme Court of
- Id. § 58.04.
E. CRAwFoRD, supra note 26, at § 73. - McVey v. Chesapeake & Potomac
Tel. Co., 103 W. Va. 519, 138 S.E. 97 (1927).
Other examples of remedial legislation include statutes imposing liens, bank-
ruptcy legislation, statutes pertaining to mortgages, health laws, homestead and
other exemption statutes, and wrongful death statutes. For more examples, see 3
C. SANDS, STATUTES & STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 60.02 (4th ed. 1943).
" See 99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 20(b), at 95 n.91 (1958).
Acts of the 31st W. Va. Leg. ch. 10, § 44, Reg. Sess. (1913) (emphasis added).
3 Acts of the 34th W. Va. Leg. ch. 131, § 44, Reg. Sess. (1913). The section
reads:
The commissioner shall not be bound by the usual common law or
statutory rules of evidence, but shall adopt formal rules of practice and
procedure as herein provided, and may make investigations in such man-
ner as in his judgment is best calculated to ascertain the substantial
rights of the parties and to carry out the provisions of this act.
The corresponding Code section today is W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-1-15 (1973
Replacement Volume), which reads:
The commissioner shall not be bound by the usual common-law or
statutory *rules of evidence, but shall adopt formal rules of practice and
procedure as herein provided, and may make investigations in such man-
[Vol. 77
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Appeals began almost immediately to incorporate the spirit of lib-
erality into its decisions 35 and has uniformly applied the liberality
rule since then, despite the omission of the justifying language.
The first case to seriously question the present basis for the
rule was the recent case of Whitt v. State Workmen's Compensa-
tion Commissioner,6 which involved the quantity of evidence nec-
essary to substantiate a claim under the Act. After reviewing the
history of the liberality rule, the court concluded: "[T]here is no
provision in the workmen's compensation law requiring the com-
missioner, the appeal board, or this Court to apply a rule of 'liber-
ality' either in construing the workmen's compensation law or ap-
praising the evidence in a workmen's compensation case."" De-
spite the criticism leveled at the liberality rule in Whitt, the West
Virginia court has followed the rule in subsequent decisions. In
Johnson v. State Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, the
court stated that it "is required to be guided by the rule of liberal-
ity both in the application of pertinent statutes and in appraising
the evidence in support of the claim."" In Barnett v. State Work-
men's Compensation Commissioner, the court reiterated that the
compensation law of West Virginia is remedial in nature and is to
be liberally construed. 9 These cases indicate that the West Vir-
ginia court will continue to follow the liberality rule in spite of the
absence of a statutory basis.
Even though the Fourth Circuit strictly construed the Act, it
did acknowledge the existence of the liberality rule."0 Thus it be-
comes questionable whether the Fair case will be valuable as pre-
cedent. However, in light of the recent West Virginia decisions
applying the liberality rule, the Fourth Circuit should conform to
West Virginia case law and apply the rule in a similar manner.
Thomas W. Smith
ner as in his judgment is best calculated to ascertain the substantial
rights of the parties and to carry out the provisions of this chapter.
31 Culurides v. Ott, 78 W. Va. 696, 90 S.E. 270 (1916); Poccardi v. Ott, 82 W.
Va. 497, 96 S.E. 790 (1918); Sole v. Kindleberger, 91 W. Va. 603, 114 S.E. 151
(1922).
- 153 W. Va. 688, 172 S.E.2d 375 (1970).
Id. at 692, 172 S.E.2d at 377.
- 186 S.E.2d 771, 776 (W. Va. 1972).
39 153 W. Va. 796, 799, 172 S.E.2d 698, 700 (1970).
1" 473 F.2d at 705. The court stated that it was "mindful that the West Virginia
Act should not be viewed with an overly technical eye."
6
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